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The claim of a fire insurance company, which has paid
Assignment, insurance to a mortgagee, to a part of the proceeds
Claim to
of a mortgage sale, upon the ground of subrogaSubrogation tion to the rights of the mortgagee, is assignable:
Hare v. Headley, (Court of Chancery of New Jersey; Emery,
V. C.,) 35 Atl. Rep. 445.
According to a recent decision of Vice-Chancellor Stevens,
of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, when a testator has
bequeathed to an incorporated school and its
Charity,
Bequest In successors a fund in trust, the income thereof to
Trust,
be used for the education of poor children in its
Termination

district, the abandonment of the school and diversion of the fund will not terminate the trust, so as to entitle
the next of kin to the fund; but that still remains subject to a
trust for the education of the class of persons designated in the
trust instrument, to be administered by equity through the
appointment of a trustee: Green v. Blackwell, 35 Atl. Rep.
375By the doctrine of cy !pris,as originally established in England, the king's prerogative imposed upon him the duty, as
parens patriae, to see that the charitable inclinations of his
subjects were carried into effect, in any event; and hence the
chancellor early assumed the right of applying a charitable
bequest which had failed for want of an object, a legal mode
of execution, or because it was contrary to law, to some valid
charitable purpose, arbitrarily selected by him. But this
practice has been restrained in modern times, and it is now the
settled rule in England that a charitable gift will be applied
ey pirs only when, from its tenor, a general intent appears that
it shall go to charity in any event, irrespective of the failure of
the particular purpose: Atty. Gen. v. Minshull, 4 Ves. II,
709
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This rule, however, never obtained in the United'
1798.
States in even its modified form, since the royal prerogatives
were never assumed by the courts of equity, or granted tothem; and accordingly the doctrine of cy prts, properly
speaking, never obtained here: Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How.
369, 1855; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 1871; American Academy v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, (Mass.) 582,
1859; Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, 1866; Tilden v.
Green, 13o N. Y. 29, 1891. But in order that the charitable
intent of the testator should not be wholly defeated where it is
possible to uphold it legally, the courts of the United States
have adopted a modified form of the English rule. This is
enunciated in Phila.v. Girard,45 Pa. 9, 1863, as follows:
"A well-defined charity, or one where the means of definition are given, may be enforced in favor of the general intent,
even where the mode or means provided for by the donor fail
by reason of their inadequacy or unlawfulness. . . . The
meaning of the doctrine of cy prks, as received by us, is, that
when a definite function or duty is to be performed, and it
cannot be done in exact conformity with the scheme of theperson or persons who have provided for it, it must be performed with as close approximation to that scheme as reasonably practicable, and so, of course, it must be enforced. It is
the doctrine of approximation, and is not at all confined to the
administration of charities, but is equally applicable to all
-devises and contracts wherein the future is provided for, and it
is an essential element of equity jurisprudence."
In some states this limited cy prs doctrine has been adopted.
as a part of their general jurisprudence: Gilman v. Hamilton,.
16 Ill. 225, 1854; Howard v. American Peace Soc., 49 Me.
:88, I86o; B/iss v. American Bible Soc., 2 Allen, (Mass.) 334,
186I; Academy of the Vrisitation v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167,
1872; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 1835; in others, it has been
adopted by statute: Acts Pa. 1855, April 26, P. L. 328, § io;
1876, May 26, P. L. 211 ; 1889, May 9, P. L. 173; Derbyv.
Derby, 4 R. I. 414, 1856; and in others, it has been wholly
rejected: Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 1871 ; Holland v.
A/cock, io8 N. Y. 312, 1888 ; Tilden v. Green, 13o N. Y. 29,
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1891; Holland v. Peck, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 255, 1842; Dickson v. .Montgomery, I Swan, (Tenn.) 348, 185 1.
According to this doctrine, a charitable bequest which is
void ab initio, by reason of its being illegal, or which neverattaches because of the extinction of its object during the
testator's lifetime, or fails after his death by reason of the total
extinction of those objects, will not be administered cyprs ;
but if the mode of execution of the trust only is illegal, or ifthat only fails, it will be so administered, and a new mode ofapplication appointed: Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 IIl. 225, 1854;
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, (Mass.) 539, 1867; Venable v.
Coffinan, 2 W. Va. 310, 1867. Thus, a bequest to a school
society was ordered, after the abolition of such societies, to beapplied to the purchase of books for poor scholars, and defraying their other expenses : Birchardv. Scott, 39 Conn. 63, 1872;:
a fund bequeathed to one college to support students was
ordered, in the suspension of that college, to be administered'
cy pris through another: Barnardv. Adams, 58 Fed. Rep.
313, 1893 ; and a fund left to trustees, to establish a femaleacademy in a town, was applied to the support of a public
school, the former project proving to be impracticable : AdamsFemale Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H. 225, 1889.
So, in Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 358, 1849,
where a bequest was made to the "Marine Bible Society,"'
and there was no society of that name in existence, but it was
shown that at or shortly before the time of the execution of thewill there was an association known as "The Boston Young
Men's Marine Bible Society," the object of which was "to.
circulate Bibles among destitute seamen," and that this societyhad been dissolved, or become extinct, at the time of the tes-tator's death, the court appointed a trustee to receive and
dispose of the bequest, by appropriating the avails thereof tothe purchase of Bibles, to be distributed among destitute sea-men ; in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.), 539, 1867, a
bequest "for the preparation and circulation of books, newspapers, the delivery of speeches, lectures, and such othermeans as in their judgment will create a public sentiment that:
will put an end to negro slavery in this country," and another-
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-'for the benefit of fugitive slaves who may escape from the
slave-holding states," were directed, on the cy pros principle,
to be applied as follows: the first to be paid by the trustees,
from time to time, to an association already established, to
promote the education, support and interests of the freedmen,
lately slaves, in those states in which slavery had been so
abolished, to be expended for that object; and the second,
(being of small amount,) to the use of necessitous persons
of negro descent in Boston and vicinity, preference being
given to such as had escaped from slavery; and in Atty. Gen.
v. Briggs, 164 Mass. 561, 1895, it was held that where it has
been found impracticable to administer the gift in a will of the
income of a fund for the support of a school in a certain
school district in a town precisely according to the terms of
the will, even if the benefits from the fund shall be shared by
all the inhabitants of the town, it will not be extending the
-effect of the gift beyond the proper scope of the doctrine of
£y pris in its application to such a case; and, if it is plainly
within the testator's general intent that the town as a whole
shall share his bounty, if it cannot otherwise be made available by those residing in the district specified, this court will
frame a scheme for applying the income of the fund to educational purposes for the benefit of persons living within the territory which was formerly such district, and in that vicinity,
and of such other persons in the town as in the exercise of
their legal rights may incidentally derive advantage from it.
InJones v. State, 25 S. E. Rep. 318, the Supreme Court of
Georgia lately held, that when the purchaser-of goods worth
Cheating, twenty-five cents delivered to the seller a twentydollar gold piece, ignorantly supposing that it was
Evidence
a silver dollar, and the latter perceiving the mistake, retained
the coin, and returned only seventy-five cents in change, he
-was guilty of being a common cheat and swindler, under the
provisions of § 4595 of the Georgia Code.
In a recent case before Vice-Chancellor Pitney, of the
,Court of Chancery of New Jersey, the defendant joined with
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Corporations,
Promoters,
Fraud

the owner of a tract of land in procuring options
of doubtful value on adjoining tracts, and then
organized a corporation, of which he became

president, to purchase the land at an advanced price, under an
agreement with his co-promoter only that he was to receive
part of the profits thus realized. He procured deeds to be
made to himself of all the land for an actual consideration of
$66,223, recited in the deeds as $8o,ooo, and conveyed it to
the corporation for $8o,ooo and four hundred shares of stock.
He distributed the stock pro rata among the stockholders, and
kept the profits. None of the money paid to the vendors of
the land belonged to the defendant or his co-promoter, but all
was furnished by the corporation. Upon these facts, it was
held that the defendant occupied the position of a promoter of
the corporation, and that it was entitled to recover from him
the profits so withheld: Woodbury Heights Land Co. v. Loudenslager, 35 Ad. Rep. 436.
Since the promoters of a corporation occupy a fiduciary
relation towards it, they must use the utmost good faith in
their dealings with it. They must disclose all the facts
material to the transaction, and must state them truly; and if
they fail to do this, the corporation, when it learns the true
state of affairs, may either rescind the transaction, provided
that no equities intervene, or compel the promoters to account
to it for the profit they have made. Accordingly, when a
promoter undertakes to sell to the corporation property of
which he is the owner, or in which he has an interest, it becomes
a very material question whether he acted in the transaction
as the agent of the corporation, or as a stranger. If he
acted in the former capacity, he cannot make and retain any
private profit, because to do so would be a fraud on his principal. So, if he buys the property with the object of reselling it
to the corporation, he cannot retain any sum received from the
corporation in excess of the price he himself paid for it; and
it makes no difference in this regard whether the price he
receives is more or less than the actual value of the property.
The corporation is entitled to all the benefits which may
accrue to him from the transaction: Hikhens v. Congreve, 4
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'Russ. 562, 1828; Kent v. FreeholdLand & Brickmaking Co.,'
17 L. T. N. S. 77, 1867; In re Coal Economising Co., i Ch.
D. 182, 1875; Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3
App. Cas. 1218, 1878, affirming 5 Ch. D.'73, 1877 ; ExMission Land & Water Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 6io, 1893 ; Getty
v. Devlin, 54 N. Y. 403, 1873; Donris v. French, 4 Hun,
(N. Y.) 292, 1875 ; McElhenny's Ap.peal, 6i Pa. 188, 1869;
Simons v. Vulcan Oil & Mining Co., 6i Pa. 202. If, how-ever, the promoter deals with the corporation as a stranger,
.and at arms' length, he is entitled to any profit he can make.
As was said by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, in Foss v. Harbottle,
2 Hare, 461, 1843, " A party may have a clear right to say,
'I begin the transaction at this time; I have purchased land,
no matter how or from whom, or at what price; I am willing
to sell it at a certain price for a given purpose.'
Even when the promoter acts as the agent of the corporation, if he is under no special duty to purchase the land in
-question on behalf of the corporation, he may sell his own
land to it, or buy land of another, and resell to it, at any price
-he chooses to set upon it, if he acts in a perfectly fair and open
manner, and the corporation has full knowledge of the facts.
But in such a case it is necessary,--first, that the promoter furnish the corporation with a board of directors who will act
independent of his influence, and exercise a proper judgment
-in purchasing the land: Erlangerv. New Sombrero Phosphate
Co., 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1878, affirming 5 Ch. D. 73, 1877;
In re Hess Mfg. Co., 23 Can. Sup. Ct. 644, 1894; Plaquemines TropicalFruit Co.v. Buck, 52 N. J. Eq. 219, 1894; Rice's
Appeal,79 Pa. i68, 1875; second, he must disclose the fact
that he owns or has an interest in the property, and the nature
-of that interest, in order that the corporation may have full
means of judging of the due weight of his arguments in favor
.of the purchase: Erlangerv. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3
App. Cas. 1218, 1878, affirming 5 Ch. D. 73, 1877; Ex-Assion Land & Water Co. v. Flas, 97 Cal. 6io, 1893; Burbank
v. Dennis, IOI Cal. 9o, 1894; and third, he must state all the
material facts, and state them truly. He is not obliged to
nention the price he has paid for the property; if he chooses,
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he can say, " I will sell it to you for such a price;" but if he
undertakes to state the cost price, he must state it correctly.
If he misstates it, it is fraud, which will be ground for either
rescission, or for compelling him to account for the profit he
has made: Erlangerv. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App.
.Cas. 1218, 1878, affirming 5 Ch. D. 73, 1877; Ex-fffzssion Land
& Water Co. v.Flash, 97 Cal. 6Io, 1893; Burbank v. Dennis,
ioi Cal. 9o, 1894; McElhenny's Appea, 61 Pa. 188, 1869;
Simons v. Vulcan Oil & Mining Co., 61 Pa. 202,' 1869; Short
v. Stevenson, 63 Pa. 95, I869; Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore,
*64 Pa. 43, 1870; Pittsburgh Mn.Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis.
307, 1889. The mere concealment of a defect in the title to
the property will also constitute a fraud which will vitiate the
transaction: Phosphate Sewage Co.v. Hartmont, 5 Ch. D. 394,
1877.
If the promoter is not himself the owner, either in whole or
:in part, of the property purchased by the corporation, but
merely a middleman between the owner and the corporation,
the same rules apply. If he acts as the agent of the corporation, he cannot retain any secret profit accruing to himself
from the transaction, whether that profit take the form of a
lump sum paid by the owner, a percentage of the amount
obtained from the corporation over and above an upset price,
or a gift of stock in the corporation : Atwool v. Merryweather,
5 L. R. Eq. 464, 1868; Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, 5
L. R. P. C. 221, 1874; Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch.D. 371,
1877; Emma Silver Mning Co. v. Grant, ii Ch. D. 918,
1878; Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Lewis, 4 C. P. D. 396,
1879 ; In re Fitzroy Bessemer Steel Co., 5o L. T. N. S. 144,
1884; (see Id. v. Id., 33 W. R. 312, 1885;) Lydney & Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v. Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85, 1886, reversing 3'
Ch. D. 328, 1885; In re Hess Mfg. Co., 23 Can. Sup. Ct.
644, 1894, affirming 21 Ont. App. 66, 1894, which reversed
23 Ont. Rep. 182, 1892; Chandler v. Bacon, 3o Fed. Rep.
538, 1887 ; St. L. & Utah Mining Co. v. Jackson, 5 Cent. L.
J. 317, 1887; Yale Gas Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. IOI,
1894; Brewster v.Hatch, 122 N. Y. 349, 189o.
It does not necessarily follow that a promoter who is com-
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pelled to account must pay over the whole of the profit hehas received. If he has expended funds of his own in legiti-.
mate expenses incurred in forming and organizing the corporation, or if he is entitled to renumeration for his services,
he is entitled to credit therefor: Emma Silver Mining Co. v.
Grant, ii Ch. D. 918, 1878 ; Burbank v. Dennis, ioi Cal. 90,.
1894; but he is not entitled to credit for illegal expenses
incurred and paid, such as payments to another to obtain a
personal guarantee for the taking of stock: Lydney & Wigpool
Aron Ore Co. v. Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85, 1886, reversing 31 Ch..
D. 328, 1885.
A promoter will not be held liable to refund secret profits,
if the corporation has delayed seeking to recover them for too
long a time, so that the equities of third persons have intervened, or rescission has become impossible: Ladywell Mining
Co. v. Brookes, 35 Ch. D. 400, 1887, affirming 34 Ch. D.
398, 1886; or if the purchase was made with the knowledge
and assent of all the members of the corporation: fn re
Ambrose Lake Tin & Copper Mining Co., 14 Ch. D. 390, I88O.
But if the corporation refuses to sue on demand by the stockholders, the latter may recover from the promoter: Burbank
v. Dennis, IOI Cal. 9 o , 1894.
Stock dividends, declared from net earnings made after the
death of a testator who bequeathed for life the stock on which
the dividends were declared, belong to the lifeStock
Dividends, tenant as income, not to the remaindermen as part
Rights of
of the corpus of the estate : Pritchett v. Nashville
Life Tenant
Trust Co., (Supreme. Court of Tennessee,) 36 S.
W. Rep. 1O64.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Georgia, the:
accused introduced no evidence on the trial in the court below,,
Criminal aw. and thus obtained the right to open and conclude
Right to Open the argument to the jury. At the conclusion of
and Close,
the evidence one of his counsel addressed the
Appeal,
Review
jury, after which the counsel for the state, without
any previous warning of such an intention, announced that he.
did not desire to argue the case. One of the counsel for the
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accused, who had not addressed the jury, then approached the
judge, and stated privately that he desired to argue the case,
and wished the court to know that he insisted upon it, as a
legal right of the accused, but the judge informed him, also
privately, that no further speech would be allowed for the
accused, that the rule was that in no case should more than
one counsel be heard in conclusion, and that under the circumstances the accused had had both the opening and the
conclusion. This was assigned as error, but the Supreme
Court held that if the counsel desired to invoke a ruling of the
court on the question, he should have made in open court a
request or motion for permission to argue the case, and obtain
a decision thereon, instead of approaching it privately;. and
that the private conversation between him and the judge was
not proper subject-matter for review: Grant v. State, 25 S. E.
Rep. 399.
The question as to the liability of a company which maintains and uses a wire charged with a powerful electric current
has of late frequently engaged the attention of the
Electric
Wires,
courts. One of the most recent cases dealing
Negligence
therewith is that of Atlanta ConsolidatedSt. Ry.
Co. v. Owings, 25 S. E. Rep. 377, in which the Supreme
Court of Georgia held: (i) That when, in the prosecution of
its business, a corporation employs a wire which, because of
its being charged with a powerful and dangerous current of
electricity, is liable, upon coming in contact with the wires of
other corporations, to cause injury or death to the employes of
the latter while engaged in the performance of their duties, the
former corporation owes the employes of the latter the duty of
observing at least ordinary diligence, not only in preventing
such contact, but also in discovering it and preventing its continuance, though occasioned by the negligence of others; and
even when the negligence is that of the corporation whose
employes are thus exposed to danger; and
(2) That if a person, while upon a pole a considerable distance above the ground, is so shocked, burned and put in
pain by a current of electricity that he loses his strength or
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consciousness, and the control of his movements, and in con-sequence falls to the ground and dies, it is safe to assert that
his death was caused by the electric current, whether or not
death would have ensued if the deceased had not fallen from
the pole.

The Supreme Court of Alabama' has recently decided, that
when a testatrix, during her lifetime, directed her agent to
invest the proceeds of certain real estate in AlaEquitable
Conversion
bama state bonds, and those proceeds came to his
hands before her death, but he failed to so invest them until
after that event, while executor, the bonds so purchased would
not pass under a bequest of "whatever Alabama state bonds
I may have remaining at the time of my death, now amounting to seven in number, of one thousand dollars each," on the
ground that the direction of the testatrix to the agent created
an equitable conversion of the fund into said bonds, though
she owned no other bonds of that state: Bromberg v. Bates,
20 So. Rep. 786.

The questions arising under the contract of fidelity insurance are now of sufficient frequency and importance to make
this a distinct branch of the law of insurance.
Fidelity
Insurance,
Construction
Cbangeof

Contrary to what might have been expected, however, the decisions on these questions by the different courts of the United States have been rea-

Employment,
Knowledge of
Co-employe

sonably consonant. The latest cases on this subject come from the Supreme Court of Georgia,

of Poicy,

which holds
(I) That under a contract by which a fidelity and casualty
company binds itself to'make good to a bank, to a specified
extent, such pecuniary loss as the latter may sustain by reason
of the fraud or dishonesty of a designated employe in connection with his duties as receiving teller, "or the duties to
which, in the employer's service, he may be subsequently
appointed or assigned by the employer," the bank has the
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-right to confer upon him the office of assistant cashier, in
addition to that of receiving teller, without notifying the com_pany; and after this is done, the company is as much bound
to make good to the bank losses occasioned during the
period covered by the contract by reason of the dishonesty or
fraud of the employe while acting in the capacity of assistant
cashier, as those occurring while he acts in that of receixing
teller;
(2) That although the contract of insurance requires the bank
to give notice to the company of any act of fraud or dishonesty on the part of the employe in question, immediately
upon the discovery thereof, and also to notify the company
immediately after knowledge by the bank of the commission
of any act on his part involving a loss to the company of more
than one hundred dollars, yet when the contract contains no
stipulation making it in any degree incumbent on the bank to
exercise any diligence or care in inquiring intp or supervising the
conduct of that employe, or of any of his fellow employes in its
service, and imposes upon it no duty to vouch for the fidelity
-or efficiency of the latter, or to require them to watch and
report upon his actions, information or knowledge on the part
of the cashier of the bank, (who is only a fellow employe,) as
to the matters concerning which the insurer company had
stipulated for notice, would not, so far as it is concerned, be
imputable, under these circumstances, to the bank itself: Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Natl. Bk., 25 S. E. Rep. 392.
See Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N. Y, 63 Fed. Rep. 48, 1894; Mechanics'
Say. Bk. & Trust Co. v. Guarantee Co. of North America, 68
Fed. Rep. 459, 1895.
By another decision of the same court, a fidelity insurance
company which covenanted with a receiver engaged in operrating a railroad that during the continuance of
Default of
Employe
its bond certain specified employes of the receiver
should "faithfully and honestly discharge their duties in their
several capacities, and shall also faithfully and truly account
for all moneys and property and other things which may
come into their possession in their respective employments,
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whenever thereto required by the employer, or a duly-authorized officer in that behalf, and, at the termination of their said
employments, shall surrender and deliver up to the employer,
or a duly-authorized representative, all moneys, books,
vouchers, papers, tickets, and all other property belonging to
the employer, or for which the employer shall be liable to
another, or other party or parties, which shall then be, or
which ought to be, in the hands, possession, or custody of
the employes, or either of them; and the company hereby
indemnifies the employer against all loss which the employer
shall sustain by reason of the default of any or either of the
employes in the premises, not exceeding in the whole the
sum or sums as hereinafter provided," was held not liable to
the insured in damages for a loss resulting from a wrongful
delivery of freight by one of these employes, in consequence
of which the receiver was compelled to pay the value of the
freight to its true owner, since the wrongful delivery occurred
before the bond *as executed; and that the fact that the
employe, though liable to do so, failed and refused, at the
termination of his employment, to pay the receiver the damages the latter sustained by reason of the wrongful delivery,
did not impose any liability upon the insurer: Dorsey v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 25 S. E. Rep. 521.
When a fire insurance policy contains a subrogation clause,
providing that the loss, if any, shall be payable to a mortgagee,
or his assigns, as his or their interest may appear,
Pire
Insurance,
the owner of the mortgage is the insured, to the
subrogation extent of his interest, and a change of title which
Clause,

increases his interest in the insured property, even
to absolute ownership, is not such a change of
ownership as requires notice to be given to the insurer, under
a stipulation in the policy that the mortgagee shall notify the
insurer of any change of ownership; and therefore a failure to
give notice will not release the insurer from liability: Dodge v.
Ilamburg-BremenFire Ins. Co., (Court of Appeals of Kansas,
Southern Department, D. C.,) 46 Pac. Rep. 25.
Another new phase of insurance is that of insurance against
liability for damages, or, to give it a distinct name, liability
Change of

Title
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,Insurance

Against

iabmty for
Damages,

insurance.
This differs somewhat from other
modes of insurance, since, as was recently held by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, a policy promis-

ing to pay all damages with which the assured
may be legally charged, or required
to pay, or for
which it may be legally liable, is not a contract of indemnity
alone, but also a contract to pay liabilities ; and a discharge of
such liabilities by the assured is not a necessary condition precedent to a recovery thereon, the measure of recovery being
the amount of the accrued liability: American Employers'
Liability Ins. Co. v. Fordyce, 36 S. W. Rep. 1051.
No action can be maintained on the policy, however, until
-the liability is liquidated.
Construction
of Policy

A municipal corporation, which has paid a salary to a
PublicOfficer, de facto officer, who performed the duties of
Officedefacto, the office, under color of title, while the right
Payment of

to it was in litigation, cannot
therefor again to another who
establish his title to the office:
County, (Supreme Court of South Dakota,) 68
Salary,

Rights of
Officer
de lure

be held liable
may thereafter
Fullerv. Roberts
N. W. Rep. 308.

The Supreme Court of Michigan has lately held, that when
it does not appear that a suit pending in the circuit court
involves, or is in any way connected with, the land
Public
that an abstractor was employed to abstract the
Records,
Inspection,
Abstractor of title of, by way of contract, or otherwise, or that
it is necessary to the interests of his employer that
Titles
lie be allowed to inspect the file of the suit, mandamus will notlie
to compel the county clerk to allow him to inspect and copy
-the file before trial: Burton v. Reynolds, 68 N. W. Rep. 217.
There was no general right of inspection and examination
-of public records at common law, unless the person who
sought it had some interest in the matters contained in them,
-either as a citizen or as a private individual; and in the latter
instance, only when that interest was involved in a pending
suit. If no such interest existed, the custodian of the records
might grant or refuse an inspection at his discretion, and the
court would not control him in its exercise: King v. justices,
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6 Ad. & El. 84, 1837; In re McLean, 9 Cent. L. J. 425, 1879.
This rule, however, was soon relaxed, and the distinction between public and private interests became obsolete: Herbertv.
Ashburner, I Wils. 297, 1750; Peole v. Corl, 47 Barb.
(N. Y.) 329, 1867; and the constant multiplication of public
records, with the fact that their existence is notice to all the
world of the matters containedin them, renders it imperativethat
any one who has an interest in such records should be allowed
to inspect them at will, and to enforce his right against the
refusal of the custodian: fHarison v. Williams, 4 D. & R.
820, 1824; Brewer v. Watson, 61 Ala. 310, 1878; Id. v. Id.,
65 Ala. 88, 188o; Id.v. Id., 71 Ala. 299, 1882; Silvery.
Whitmore, 45 Ill.224, 1867; Hawes v. Wite, 66 Me.
305, 1876; Aitcheson v. Huebner, 90 Mich. 643, 1892.
This right, however, does not extend to records which are
only quasi-public, such as the court-rolls of an English manor:
Hereford v. Bridgewater, Bunb. 269, 1729; the records of a
church or cemetery, or a marriage license docket: In re Marriage License Docket, (Pa.) 4 D. R. 284, 1895 ; contra, Id., 4
D. R. 162, 1895 ; or the records of a justice of the peace:
Perkins v. Cummings, 66 Vt. 485, 1894; and certainly does
not exist when the only purpose for which the inspection is
sought is that of gratifying private curiosity or malice, of'
making public scandalous matters, or of acquiring gain through
disclosure of private affairs to the world: see Park v. Press
Co., 72 Mich. 560, 569, 1888; Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich.
I, 1891.
In most of the United States this right of inspection of'
public records is granted by statute; and where this is the
case, any one has a right to inspect them at pleasure, irrespective of any interest he may have therein, unless, perhaps,
when the disclosure sought would be detrimental to the public
interests, or contrary to sound policy, or is sought on behalf
of a citizen of another state: Brewer v. Watson, 61 Ala. 310,.
1878; Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 51 Mich. 145, 1883;.
In re Marriage License Docket, (Pa.) 4 D. R. 284, 1895;
contra, Id., 4 D. R. 162, 1895 ; and if the clerk refuses to.
permit it, he may be compelled to do so, and cannot demand'.
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fees therefor: In re Chambers,44 Fed. Rep. 786, 1891 ; Lum
v. McCarty, 39 N. J. L. 287, 1877; State v. Long, 37 W. Va.
266, 1892. An inspection will be enforced, even though by the
rules of the office the records are to be kept secret: Er p.
.Drawbaugh, 2 D. C. App. 4o4, 1894. But the records of
private suits stand on a different footing; they.are not strictly
public until the trial is over, and public policy frequently
forbids their disclosure. Accordingly, 4 newspaper or private
individual cannot enforce an inspection of them for the purpose of gratifying private animosity, or of making personal
profit out of the disclosure of the private matters contained in
them: Park v. Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 569, 1888; Schmeddingv. May, 85 Mich. i, 1891.
It is by no means finally settled whether the right of inspection extends to the case of an abstractor or insurer of titles,
who, by making searches for compensation, interferes with the
emoluments of'the custodian of the records, and who also, in
populous and wealthy districts, by occupying the office of the
custodian with a force of men for the purpose of abstracting
all the records, may interfere with the business of the office
and the rights of others. On various grounds, the unsubstantial one of apprehended injury to the records, as well as the
more reasonable ones stated above, this right has been held
not to exist in Alabama: Phelan v. State, 76 Ala. 49, 1884;
Randolpz v. State, 82 Ala. 527, 1886; in Colorado: Bean v.
People, 7 Colo. 200, 1883; in Georgia: Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga.
39 1, 1874; in Maryland: Belt v. PrinceGeorge's Co. Abstract Co.,
73 Md. 289, 189o; in Michigan: Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich.
534, 188o; and in New Jersey: Fleming v. Clerk, 30 N. J. L.
280, 1863. But the Michigan case was soon overruled: Burton
v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 1889; and the legislature of Colorado
passed an act on the heels of the decision there, declaring the
right in terms beyond a peradventure: Stocknan v. Brooks,
17 Colo. 248, 1892. In New Jersey, however, the Court of
Errors and Appeals, after overruling Fleming v. Clerk, 30
N. J. L. 28o, 1863, in Lum v. ffcCarty, 39 N. J. L. 287,
1877, has recently overruled the latter and returned to its first
love : Barber v. West Jersey Title & Guaranty Co., 53 N. J.
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Eq. 158, 1895, reversing 49 N. J. Eq. 474, 1892. In spite
of this conflict of opinion, however, the weight of authority, as
well as of reason, supports the view that an abstractor has a
right to inspect the records for any reason he chooses to give, or
without any, and to copy them, if he sees fit, as long as in so
doing he does not interfere with the business of the office or
the rights of others, and cannot be required to pay the custodian of the records for that privilege: In re C/hambers, 44 Fed.
Rep. 786, 1891; Stocknan v. Brooks, 17 Colo. 248, 1892;
Upton v. Catlin, 17 Colo. 546, 1892 ; Burtonv. Tuite, 78 Mich.
363, 1889; Id. v. Id., 8o Mich. 218, 189o; Day v. Button,
96 Mich. 6oo, 1893; Burton v. Reynolds, 102 Mich. 55, 1894;
People v. Richards, 99 N. Y. 620, 1885: People v. Reilly, 38
Hun, (N. Y.) 429, 1886; Comm. v. O'Donnel, (Pa.) 12 W.
N. C. 291, 1882; Hanson v. Eichstaedt,69 Wis. 538, 1887.
But the custodian has the right to make reasonable rules
and regulations for the use of his office, ahd to these the
abstractor must conform: Upton v. Catlin, 17 Colo. 546, 1892;
Day v. Button, 96 Mich. 6oo, 1893 ; People v. Richards,99 N. Y.
620, 1885 ; and the payment of a fee for providing additional
office facilities is a reasonable regulation: Burton v. Reynolds,
102 Mich. 55, 1894.
Some courts have attempted to draw a distinction between
the right of inspection and the right of copying the records;
affirmingthe former and denying the latter, unless the abstractor
was employed for that special purpose: Randolph v State, 82
Ala. 527, 1886; Cormack v. Wolcott, 37 Kans. 391, 1887;
Boylan v. Warren, 39 Kans. 301, 1888; but this is fallacious,
and is generally obviated by an express provision granting the
right of making copies: State v. Rachac, 37 Minn. 372, 1887;
Hanson v. Eichstaedt,69 Wis. 538, 1887.
Irrespective of other considerations, one would think that
when a corporation was chartered for the express purpose of
making abstracts and insuring titles these rights accrued to it:
People v. Reilly, 38 Hun, (N. Y.) 429, 1886; but the Court of
Appeals of. Maryland is of a different opinion: Belt v. Prince
George's Co. Abstract Co., 73 Md. 289, 189o.
The proper method of enforcing this right, when denied by
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the custodian, is by mandamus, as was asserted or admitted in
almost all the cases cited above, especially in Barber v. -West
Jersey Title & Guaranty Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 158, 1895, reversing
49 N. J. Eq. 474, 1892 ; see, also, Brewer v. Watson, 6I Ala.
3io, 1878 ; Id. v. Id., 65 Ala. 88, i88o; Id. v.. Id., 71 Ala.
299, 1882; Hawes v. White, 66 Me. 305, 1876; Aitcheson v.
Huebner, 90 Mich. 643, 1892; People v. Cornell, 47 Barb.
(N. Y.) 329, 1867; State v. Long, 37 W. Va. 266, 1892. In
the few cases in which the remedy by injunction has been
tried, the right has either been denied, or the selection of the
remedy held erroneous: Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391, 1874;
Scribner v. Chase, 27 Ill. App. 36, 1888; Diamond Match
Co. v. Powers, 5I Mich. 145, 1883; Beltv. Prince George's Co.
Abstract Co., 73 Md. 289, 189o; Barberv. West Jersey Title
& Guaranty Co., 53 N. J. Eq. i58, 1895, reversing 49 N. J.
Eq. 474, 1892; in spite of the many considerations which
would seem to make that remedy preferable: see 31 AM. L.
REG. N. S. 769.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, a ticket given to an
Railroys,
employe of a railroad who lives at a distance from
the terminus of the road is not free, if it is given in
consideration of his services as an employe; and an
employe riding on such a ticket is not a free pasfrom Liability senger,
and accordingly, the company
cannot, by
contract, exempt itself from liability to him for its negligence:
Doyle v. FitchburgR. R. Co., 44 N. E. Rep. 61 I.
Riding on
Free Ticket,
Contract for
Exemption

If a wife turns over to her husband money received from her
father's estate, without any agreement for its investment, the
fact that the husband subsequently informs the
Resulting
Trust,
wife that he has invested it in certain land for her,
Husband and

Wife,
Evidence

when, in fact, he has not done so, but has taken
title thereto in his own name, is not sufficient to

create a resulting trust therein in favor of the wife : Nashille
Trust Co. v. Lannom, (Court of Chancery Appeals of Ten-nessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 977.
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In a late case in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-setts, Falmouth Natl. Bk. v. Cape Cod Ship-Canal Co., 44.
Subrogation, N. E. Rep. 617, a corporation, chartered for the
purpose of constructing a canal, and required by
Lender of
Money used
its charter to make a deposit with the treasurer of
to satisfy
the commonwealth to secure the payment of
Lien
damages for land taken, and for labor in construction, entered
into a contract with an individual for the entire construction,
by which the contractor received all the stock and bonds of
the corporation, and bound himself to pay all claims against
the company growing out of the construction. The contractor issued debenture bonds, secured, with the consent of thecorporation, bj a pledge, as collateral, of his contract for
stock and bonds, and by scrip certificates of the corporation,.
exchangeable for mortgage bonds on completion of the work.
The proceeds of these debentures were used in payment forland and other claims which would have been a lien on the
fund deposited with the treasurer. But in spite of this, and
of the fact that the corporation had practically assumed the.
payment of the debentures, the holders of the latter were
held not to be entitled to a lien by subrogation on the fund in.
the bands of the treasurer.
A county road, which would be of great convenience to.
people living between two existing roads, one of which is a.
turnpike, by shortening their line of travel to the.
Turnpikes,
town in which the roads terminated, and which
Shunpikes,
Injunction

would be of great utility in time of high water, is.

not a shunpike, such as will entitle the turnpike company to
enjoin its location, though the effect of its construction would
be to decrease the business of the company: Clarksville &
R. Turnpike Co. v. City of Clarksville, (Court of ChanceryAppeals of Tennessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 979.
Ardemus Stewart.

